The Second World War in Yugoslavia is notorious for the brutal struggle between the armed forces of the Third Reich and the communist-led Partisans. Less known is the fact that the two sides negotiated prisoner exchanges virtually since the beginning of the war. Under extraordinary circumstances, these early contacts evolved into a formal exchange agreement, centered on the creation of a neutral zone—quite possibly the only such area in occupied Europe—where prisoners were regularly exchanged until late April 1945, saving thousands of lives. The leadership of both sides used the contacts for secret political talks, for which they were nearly branded as traitors by their superiors in Berlin and Moscow. This book is the first comprehensive analysis of prisoner exchanges and the accompanying contacts between the German occupation authorities and the Yugoslav Partisans. Specifically, the book will argue that prisoner exchange had a decisive influence on the POW policies of both sides and helped reduce the levels of violence for which this theater of war became infamous. It will also show that the contacts, contrary to some claims, did not lead to collusion between these two parties against either other Yugoslav factions or the Western Allies.

Prisoner exchange is as old as warfare itself. Along with ransom, it was one of the few hopes for prisoners of war until the advent of modern international law. By the beginning of the 17th century, prisoner exchange had become a recognized institute of rules and customs of war, with European states agreeing on exchange arrangements (so-called “cartels”) whenever they fought. The prime motive behind the exchange was the need to get one’s own trained soldiers back as soon as possible, but also to minimize the cost of keeping enemy prisoners. Only full-fledged “civilized” nations could form a cartel; native tribes and rebels were not seen as subjects of law. It is therefore not surprising that the British did their utmost to avoid entering a general cartel during the Revolutionary War (1775–83), for by doing so they would recognize the legitimacy of the nascent United States and their Continental Army. Approximately ninety years later, the Federal government in Washington faced the same problem and kept refusing an all-encompassing cartel with the Southern “rebels” for over a year after the beginning of hostilities in April of 1861. The deal was eventually reached in July of 1862 and would be in place until May of 1863. Although the official text read that the Union representatives signed the agreement with the people who had been “commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent,” the signing was a ...

This chapter contains a few concluding remarks. This book is the first attempt at a comprehensive analysis of non-violent contacts between the Partisans and the German occupation authorities in Yugoslavia in the Second World War. Far from being the final word on the topic, it is a starting point for further research on various aspects of POW history. Frequent exchanges of able-bodied prisoners between the occupation forces and a resistance movement, partly through a cartel negotiated directly between their high commands, was a distinctive feature of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. It was probably the only place in war-torn Europe where representatives of two irreconcilable ideologies, Communism and Nazism, met regularly at the negotiating table. Both were primarily motivated by the desire to save their own men, but the talks did mitigate, however marginally, the horrors of the war.

What transpired in Pisarovina, a small village located on the outskirts of Zagreb, is unique not only to Yugoslavia, but to the Second World War in general. Pisarovina was the location officially agreed by both the German occupation authorities and the Yugoslav Partisans to function as the center of the prisoner exchange cartel at the end of 1943. In order to facilitate this, the village and its immediate surroundings were declared a neutral zone, quite possibly the only such place in war-torn Europe. The system saved hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoners who faced an uncertain fate. Frequent contacts between the envoys provided both the Germans and the Partisans with a "back-channel" for talks on political issues and trade, as well as the opportunity to spy on each other.

Few episodes from the war in Yugoslavia have received as much attention from scholars and the general public as the so-called March Negotiations of 1943. The bulk of the NOVJ, including thousands of wounded, found itself totally surrounded in the Neretva River Valley by a heterogeneous coalition of enemy forces. With the choice of possible escape routes rapidly dwindling, Tito decided to use diplomacy. Under the guise of prisoner exchange, his envoys sought to obtain recognition of the NOVJ as a regular army from the Germans, as well as a temporary cease-fire, which would enable them to concentrate all their forces for a showdown with the Chetniks. In return, the Partisans appeared willing to discuss the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Axis powers, and did not hide their intention to oppose a British landing in Yugoslavia with all available means.

Serbia, with its large population and rich mineral and agricultural resources, was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's spiritual and economic heartland. It also hosted the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, and linked Central Europe with Greece and Turkey via strategically important lines of communication. These facts escaped neither the Germans nor the guerrilla movements which came into life after the war had begun. Therefore, Serbia enjoyed a special position in Yugoslavia in terms of the occupation system and how the occupiers dealt with the resistance they encountered. The necessities of war would force the opposing sides in other parts of the country to agree to a limited de-escalation of violence when prisoners were involved. Serbia, apart from the first months of the war, would remain excluded from these arrangements.

After the downfall of the Užice Republic in late November 1941, the focus of the war was transferred from occupied Serbia to the neighboring Independent State of Croatia. Unlike in Serbia, there were comparatively few encounters between the Partisans and the Germans west of the Drina River for the better part of 1942. Nevertheless, the Partisans in the NDH made several local attempts to exchange prisoners. After a group of German civilians was captured in Livno in August 1942, the exchange of prisoners was increasingly negotiated between the highest commands of both sides. These talks were perceived by all as a means to sound out the enemy's intentions and political aims. Consequently, both the Partisans and the Germans were keen to continue them into 1943.

This chapter examines prisoner exchanges that various units negotiated independently of the Pisarovina cartel. To provide the proper context, the chapter covers not only the contacts from 1944 and 1945, but also those which took place in the year preceding the establishment of the neutral zone. The willingness of a unit commander to offer or accept an exchange was largely dependent on the manner in which the high commands on both sides decided to wage the war. Therefore, the centrally negotiated agreement from early 1944 had a huge impact on the conduct of the war. Furthermore, several instances of German-Partisan talks pertaining to issues other than prisoner swapping are discussed as well.

Access or access point usually presents approaching roadway constructed directly along the driveway of the main road through whom vehicles are entering on or exiting from private property, but also it implies commercial approaching and access roads. Increased access-point density connected on the main road affects the disorder of functional dependence of fundamental parameters of traffic flow. An increase of access-point density on the main road has the effect of decrease of capacity and speed of traffic flow, but also increase of travel time. This paper is the outcome of research on several roadway segments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and results are presenting the distribution of access points in a function of section length. Key results are related to access-point density, i.e. number of access points on both sides of two-lane highways divided by the length of the roadway segment. Depending on access-point density, decrease of free flow speed appears on mentioned sections which value goes from 2,35 km/h to 21,53 km/h and that is significant dispersion determined free flow speeds on given sections. In this paper is analyzed unplanned and uncontrolled construction of a large number of access points along the driveway of two-lane highway, which does not attract significant attention in our country and neighborhood. The main goal of this paper is to determine decrease of speed on segment of representative road network depending on access-point density and highlight the importance and necessity of increased control of access points.

Abstract Fetal shoulder dystocia (FSD) is an unpredictable and critical obstetric intrapartum emergency, where an objective problem is the relationship between the mother's pelvis and the child, i. e., an anthropometric disorder of delivery mechanics and dynamics. It is evident that the need to perform other maneuvers indicates the severity of FSD, which in turn correlates with the consequent iatrogenic injury of the fetus and/or mother. FSD is certainly the most controversial forensic obstetric problem, with the most disputes, compensation for damages due to peripartum injury to the child and/or mother, pain suffered, the need for someone else's care, and permanent disability. Suboptimal procedures and inadequate documentation are factors of forensic risk and subsequent litigations. Prevention of FSD is generally not possible, although good antenatal care can sometimes exclude risky cases of FSD, and some rare, chronic intrauterine disorders can result in orthopedic and neurological sequelae, which is especially important in forensic analysis. Because FSD is largely impossible to predict, it must be viewed as an intrapartum acceptable risk. During childbirth, FSD may compromise the safety of the mother and unborn child, therefore education and skills acquisition are necessary for obstetric work. Risk control, proper procedures, and proper documentation, along with good communication with the pregnant women and their families, significantly reduce litigation procedures.