The public good is any good that has characteristics of non-competition and non- exclusivity. That is a good whose benefits are not exhausted for additional user, while it is difficult or impossible to exclude non-payers from its usage. As non-payers cannot be excluded from enjoying a public good, it is difficult or impossible to collect fees for its usage. Above implies the problem of optimization of production and offer of public goods, and the need to activate beyond market mechanisms of regulation of activities of public interest.

Unlike the guidelines of the neoclassical economic theory that assumes perfect information on both sides of the market and perfect certainty in the outcomes of market activities, healthcare markets are characterized, among other, by uncertainty associated with determining the appropriate level of medical care and information and knowledge asymmetry. Physicians are at the advantage in relation to their patients, because of superior information on the patients’ medical condition and knowledge of most helpful treatments. In addition, the extent of the information and knowledge asymmetry, along with agency costs of acquiring relevant information, is likely to increase as the complexity of patient’s medical condition increases. One of the significant benefits of implementing information technologies in healthcare is addressing the issue of information and knowledge asymmetry. Throughout many developed national health services, extensive e-health infrastructures and systems are now viewed as central to the future provision of safe, efficient, high-quality and citizen-centered health care by making the knowledge bases of medicine and personal electronic records accessible to consumers over the Internet.

Matematicki model izracuna agencijskih troskova postavljen u radu potvrdio je postavke agencijske teorije o utjecaju vlasnicke strukture na zaduživanje, te negativnoj korelaciji između financijske poluge i agencijskih troskova. Model je razvijen na uzorku skupine poduzeca Velike Britanije, te unatoc njegovim nedostacima, od kojih je najocitiji stavljanje u uzorak poduzeca s velikom razlikom u prosjecnim agencijskim troskovima, isti je predložak koristen i kod izracuna agencijskih troskova u poduzecima Republike Hrvatske. Zbog istaknutog ogranicenja, model je u jednom svom dijelu modificiran, a u analizu je uvedena bazna i ciljna skupina poduzeca. Pretpostavka da bazna skupina poduzeca nema agencijskih troskova jer su u vlasnistvu malog broja vlasnika, trebala je omoguciti procjenu istih kod ciljne skupine poduzeca. Nakon provedenog izracuna izabranih varijabli ukljucenih u model te ocjene ovisnosti nezavisnih varijabli modela sa zavisnom, potvrđene su hipoteze agencijskih troskova o utjecaju kapitalne strukture na agencijske troskove poduzeca, kao i postojanje agencijskih troskova u poduzecima kod kojih je vlasnicka struktura rasprsena na vise vlasnika i interesnih skupina.