Allegations about the number of German soldiers engaged in Yugoslavia was one of the pillars of the narrative about the "People's Liberation War". This issue, however, was never given a proper historiographical treatment in the socialist period. It would have shown that the number of units in Yugoslavia depended on external factors (events on major fronts and broader strategic deliberations) at least to the same extent as on internal ones (guerrilla danger), that the occupation contingent was of highly heterogeneous nature, and that large numbers are not always synonymous for combat quality. This research, based almost entirely on unpublished primary sources, will attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the strength and quality of the German occupation contingent in the second half of the war. The original plan to hold the country with a symbolic force of 2 to 4 divisions was shattered already in the summer of the same year by the outbreak of the uprising in occupied Serbia and the NDH. From the early 1942 to mid-1943, anywhere from 4 to 7 divisions were engaged in anti-guerrilla duties, and from the summer of 1943 until the arrival of the Red Army in the late autumn of 1944, from 5 to 9 divisions (parts of the divisions that were nominally responsible for securing the coast, yet in practice constantly engaged against the Partisans, not counted). In the final phase of the war, almost the entire German contingent consisting of 11 to 15 divisions (including those stationed in Slovenia) ended up fighting the regular Yugoslav army. Apart from the divisions, dozens of independent combat battalions were involved in these operations. In the worst case, a large percentage of all these units could have been used to secure the rear areas of the main fronts, and a smaller percentage could be used directly against the Allied armies. Although, in general, these formations were of lower combat value, there is no doubt that their deployment to a secondary theater of war such as the Yugoslav one was to the detriment of the German war effort.

ABSTRACT Between autumn 1943 and autumn 1944, the Wehrmacht’s 2nd Panzer Army applied novel methods to stem the ever-growing tide of Yugoslavia’s partisan movement. During the first two years of the uprising, the German doctrine for combating the guerrillas was based almost entirely on brute force; in battlefield terms, this amounted to persistent use of classic large-scale encirclement operations aimed at breaking particularly dangerous enemy concentrations. After it had become clear that this wasn’t working, the Germans slowly began applying a more diversified approach in late 1943, including more reliance on small unit tactics, flexible operational planning, and subversive propaganda. Although initially successful, these methods came too late to make a strategic impact on the course of the Yugoslavia campaign. Furthermore, they could not offset the effects of Berlin’s long-standing refusal to dedicate more resources to this secondary theater of war.

The Second World War in Yugoslavia is notorious for the brutal struggle between the armed forces of the Third Reich and the communist-led Partisans. Less known is the fact that the two sides negotiated prisoner exchanges virtually since the beginning of the war. Under extraordinary circumstances, these early contacts evolved into a formal exchange agreement, centered on the creation of a neutral zone—quite possibly the only such area in occupied Europe—where prisoners were regularly exchanged until late April 1945, saving thousands of lives. The leadership of both sides used the contacts for secret political talks, for which they were nearly branded as traitors by their superiors in Berlin and Moscow. This book is the first comprehensive analysis of prisoner exchanges and the accompanying contacts between the German occupation authorities and the Yugoslav Partisans. Specifically, the book will argue that prisoner exchange had a decisive influence on the POW policies of both sides and helped reduce the levels of violence for which this theater of war became infamous. It will also show that the contacts, contrary to some claims, did not lead to collusion between these two parties against either other Yugoslav factions or the Western Allies.

Prisoner exchange is as old as warfare itself. Along with ransom, it was one of the few hopes for prisoners of war until the advent of modern international law. By the beginning of the 17th century, prisoner exchange had become a recognized institute of rules and customs of war, with European states agreeing on exchange arrangements (so-called “cartels”) whenever they fought. The prime motive behind the exchange was the need to get one’s own trained soldiers back as soon as possible, but also to minimize the cost of keeping enemy prisoners. Only full-fledged “civilized” nations could form a cartel; native tribes and rebels were not seen as subjects of law. It is therefore not surprising that the British did their utmost to avoid entering a general cartel during the Revolutionary War (1775–83), for by doing so they would recognize the legitimacy of the nascent United States and their Continental Army. Approximately ninety years later, the Federal government in Washington faced the same problem and kept refusing an all-encompassing cartel with the Southern “rebels” for over a year after the beginning of hostilities in April of 1861. The deal was eventually reached in July of 1862 and would be in place until May of 1863. Although the official text read that the Union representatives signed the agreement with the people who had been “commissioned by the authorities they respectively represent,” the signing was a ...

This chapter contains a few concluding remarks. This book is the first attempt at a comprehensive analysis of non-violent contacts between the Partisans and the German occupation authorities in Yugoslavia in the Second World War. Far from being the final word on the topic, it is a starting point for further research on various aspects of POW history. Frequent exchanges of able-bodied prisoners between the occupation forces and a resistance movement, partly through a cartel negotiated directly between their high commands, was a distinctive feature of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. It was probably the only place in war-torn Europe where representatives of two irreconcilable ideologies, Communism and Nazism, met regularly at the negotiating table. Both were primarily motivated by the desire to save their own men, but the talks did mitigate, however marginally, the horrors of the war.

What transpired in Pisarovina, a small village located on the outskirts of Zagreb, is unique not only to Yugoslavia, but to the Second World War in general. Pisarovina was the location officially agreed by both the German occupation authorities and the Yugoslav Partisans to function as the center of the prisoner exchange cartel at the end of 1943. In order to facilitate this, the village and its immediate surroundings were declared a neutral zone, quite possibly the only such place in war-torn Europe. The system saved hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoners who faced an uncertain fate. Frequent contacts between the envoys provided both the Germans and the Partisans with a "back-channel" for talks on political issues and trade, as well as the opportunity to spy on each other.

Few episodes from the war in Yugoslavia have received as much attention from scholars and the general public as the so-called March Negotiations of 1943. The bulk of the NOVJ, including thousands of wounded, found itself totally surrounded in the Neretva River Valley by a heterogeneous coalition of enemy forces. With the choice of possible escape routes rapidly dwindling, Tito decided to use diplomacy. Under the guise of prisoner exchange, his envoys sought to obtain recognition of the NOVJ as a regular army from the Germans, as well as a temporary cease-fire, which would enable them to concentrate all their forces for a showdown with the Chetniks. In return, the Partisans appeared willing to discuss the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Axis powers, and did not hide their intention to oppose a British landing in Yugoslavia with all available means.

Serbia, with its large population and rich mineral and agricultural resources, was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's spiritual and economic heartland. It also hosted the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, and linked Central Europe with Greece and Turkey via strategically important lines of communication. These facts escaped neither the Germans nor the guerrilla movements which came into life after the war had begun. Therefore, Serbia enjoyed a special position in Yugoslavia in terms of the occupation system and how the occupiers dealt with the resistance they encountered. The necessities of war would force the opposing sides in other parts of the country to agree to a limited de-escalation of violence when prisoners were involved. Serbia, apart from the first months of the war, would remain excluded from these arrangements.

After the downfall of the Užice Republic in late November 1941, the focus of the war was transferred from occupied Serbia to the neighboring Independent State of Croatia. Unlike in Serbia, there were comparatively few encounters between the Partisans and the Germans west of the Drina River for the better part of 1942. Nevertheless, the Partisans in the NDH made several local attempts to exchange prisoners. After a group of German civilians was captured in Livno in August 1942, the exchange of prisoners was increasingly negotiated between the highest commands of both sides. These talks were perceived by all as a means to sound out the enemy's intentions and political aims. Consequently, both the Partisans and the Germans were keen to continue them into 1943.

This chapter examines prisoner exchanges that various units negotiated independently of the Pisarovina cartel. To provide the proper context, the chapter covers not only the contacts from 1944 and 1945, but also those which took place in the year preceding the establishment of the neutral zone. The willingness of a unit commander to offer or accept an exchange was largely dependent on the manner in which the high commands on both sides decided to wage the war. Therefore, the centrally negotiated agreement from early 1944 had a huge impact on the conduct of the war. Furthermore, several instances of German-Partisan talks pertaining to issues other than prisoner swapping are discussed as well.

ABSTRACT This article deals with the extensive signals surveillance program operated by the Wehrmacht and directed at their most dangerous enemy in the Balkans, the Yugoslav Partisans. This subject has so far received surprisingly little attention in academic circles despite the fact that it was one of the crucial pillars of the entire Axis counter-insurgency effort in Yugoslavia and that it was one of the most successful actions of its kind conducted by the German intelligence. Based largely osn previously unpublished primary sources, as well as post-war literature, this article will outline the workings of the program during its heyday in the years 1943–1944 and seek to establish its impact on the battlefield. As such, it will hopefully prove to be useful to both students of wartime events in the Western Balkans and to researchers of intelligence services during the Second World War in general.

English-language historiography has paid scant attention to the events in Yugoslavia in spring 1945, despite the fact that the combined strength of the armies pitted against each other amounted to around 800,000 men, and that it was the only front in Europe which was held independently by a junior member of the anti-Hitler coalition. This article provides an analysis of both the capitulation of the German Army Group E, and the widely diverging descriptions of the same event offered by German and Yugoslav authors. The main argument presented here is that the Yugoslav leadership, prompted by both internal and foreign policy considerations, did not shirk from using less-than-honourable methods to achieve its aims. In doing this, the article will also provide insights into the functioning of the historiography of the socialist era when dealing with potentially embarrassing issues.

ABSTRACT The eastern parts of Yugoslavia were the site of savage fighting between October and December 1944, as the German Army Group E tried to force its way out of an almost desperate situation it had found itself in following the evacuation of Greece. Against all odds, this huge German formation managed to best three Allied armies, rugged terrain, and autumn rains and reach the relative safety of the Independent State of Croatia, where it joined the remainder of the Axis front in the Balkans. Although this dramatic episode had been extensively written about in the former Yugoslavia and Germany, it received next to no attention in the English-speaking academic community. The article at hand will provide an overview and an analysis of military operations based on a wide plethora of primary and secondary sources of all sides. It will also argue that the ultimate success of the breakthrough was as much due to the unwillingness of the Soviet high command to devote more resources to the Balkan Front, and the structural weaknesses of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Partisans’ armies, as it was to the battlefield prowess of the Wehrmacht.