Too Little, Too Late: Evolution in German Counter-Insurgency Methods in Yugoslavia, 1943–1944
ABSTRACT Between autumn 1943 and autumn 1944, the Wehrmacht’s 2nd Panzer Army applied novel methods to stem the ever-growing tide of Yugoslavia’s partisan movement. During the first two years of the uprising, the German doctrine for combating the guerrillas was based almost entirely on brute force; in battlefield terms, this amounted to persistent use of classic large-scale encirclement operations aimed at breaking particularly dangerous enemy concentrations. After it had become clear that this wasn’t working, the Germans slowly began applying a more diversified approach in late 1943, including more reliance on small unit tactics, flexible operational planning, and subversive propaganda. Although initially successful, these methods came too late to make a strategic impact on the course of the Yugoslavia campaign. Furthermore, they could not offset the effects of Berlin’s long-standing refusal to dedicate more resources to this secondary theater of war.