Abstract The paper is a first thorough examination of what happens to one’s emails on death. The paper demonstrates that some content of emails can be protected by copyright and transmitted on death accordingly. The paper then analyzes the contractual provisions of the main email providers, Google and Microsoft, in order to determine how these contracts, regulate the transmission of emails on death. The author finds that these provisions complicate the issues of property and transmission of digital assets and do not offer a meaningful control over the assets for their users. The paper adopts a novel focus introduced in the author’s earlier research, the idea of post-mortem privacy that is the right to privacy after death. This concept serves as an argument against the default transmission of emails on death without the deceased’s consent, whether through the laws of intestacy or by requiring the service providers to provide access to the deceased’s emails. Finally, the paper canvasses a solution which combines law and technology. It is argued that much more control should be placed in the hands of emails users. Post-mortem privacy, a potentially contested phenomenon, only accentuates the need to better account for the interests of the deceased, having in mind the volume of personal data and personal nature of emails. Therefore, an in-service solution is promoted, backed up by policy and legislation.

This article explores the options for establishing a legal framework for posthumous medical data donation (PMDD). This concept has not been discussed in legal scholarship to date at all. The paper is, therefore, a first legal study of PMDD, aiming to address the gap and shed light on the most significant legal issues that could affect this concept. The paper starts by looking at the protection of the deceased’s health records and medical data, finding that this protection in law is more extensive than the general protection of the deceased’s personal data, or the protection of post-mortem privacy as a concept. The paper then investigates key issues around ownership and succession of personal data, including medical and health-related data, and how these could affect PMDD and its legal framework.

This is a preprint of a chapter accepted for publication by Facet Publishing. This extract has been taken from the author’s original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive version of this piece may be found in 'Partners for Preservation: Advancing digital preservation through cross-community collaboration' Facet, London, 9781783303472 which can be purchased from http://www.facetpublishing.co.uk/title.php?id=303472#about-tab

ABSTRACT This paper builds on the general survey of post-mortem privacy set out in the author’s earlier work. The concept of post-mortem privacy is further developed both at a theoretical level (underpinned by theories of autonomy) and a doctrinal level (considering concepts such as testamentary freedom, and the protection of personal data). Finally, the paper looks at some current developments of technology (tech solutions for the protection of post-mortem privacy) and law/policy (work done by the US Uniform Law Commission on the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act – UFADAA). The argument is that both of these regulatory modalities provide examples and illustrations of how post-mortem privacy can be recognised practically, especially in the online environment. The paper is, therefore, setting the scene further in this under-explored area, also aiming to set the basis for the author’s subsequent empirical research (attitudes towards post-mortem privacy, quantitative and qualitative).

This paper addresses the lack of legal literature in the area of death and virtual worlds. It sheds light on the legal status of different in-game assets, assessing whether these could fit within the notions of property or other relevant legal concepts such as intellectual property, usufruct, or easements. Having determined this, the paper goes on to explore the possibilities regarding the transmission of these assets on death. The author does not share views of a great portion of the legal literature arguing for recognition of "virtual property" as a concept. Rather, this paper proposes an alternative solution in order to reconcile different interests arising in VWs; primarily, those of developers and players. Recognising a phenomenon of consitutionalisation of VWs, this article suggests a solution in the form of servitudes (usufruct). Virtual usufruct is herein conceived as player's entitlement to use the VW account and profit from it, if applicable. It is suggested that the entitlement to use the account expires on death, but that it allows a player's personal representative/executor to gain access to the account and extract any possible monetary value. This solution would enable players to take more control over their virtual assets and heirs to potentially benefit from valuable VW accounts.

This article questions the preconceived notions that participants in virtual worlds are essentially consumers. Building on the existing scholarship around virtual worlds and notwithstanding the current character of virtual worlds, this paper explores aspects of End User Licence Agreements and notes the unfairness of their provisions, particularly the imbalance between user and developer interests governed by such contracts. It argues that the contracts cannot be regulated with consumer protection legislation, as interests such as property or intellectual property are beyond the scope of consumer protection regimes. Finally, recognising the phenomenon of constitutionalisation of virtual worlds, the article argues for stronger regulatory solutions in this domain, in order to strike a more appropriate balance between competing interests in virtual worlds.

This article questions the preconceived notions that participants in virtual worlds are essentially consumers. Building on the existing scholarship around virtual worlds and notwithstanding the current character of virtual worlds, this paper explores aspects of End User Licence Agreements and notes the unfairness of their provisions, particularly the imbalance between user and developer interests governed by such contracts. It argues that the contracts cannot be regulated with consumer protection legislation, as interests such as property or intellectual property are beyond the scope of consumer protection regimes. Finally, recognising the phenomenon of constitutionalisation of virtual worlds, the article argues for stronger regulatory solutions in this domain, in order to strike a more appropriate balance between competing interests in virtual worlds.