The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has enabled Industry 4.0 as a new manufacturing paradigm. The envisioned future of Industry 4.0 and Smart Factories is to be highly configurable and composed mainly of ...

Recent development in wireless technology enabling communication between vehicles led to introduction of the concept of Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC), which uses wireless vehicle-to-vehicle communication and aims at string stable behavior in a platoon of vehicles. Degradation cascades have been proposed as a way to maintain a certain level of the system functionality in presence of failures. Such degradation behaviour is usually controlled by a runtime/state manager that performs fault detection and transitions the system into states where it will remain acceptably safe. In this paper, we propose a dynamic controller manager that focuses on both safety and performance of the system. In particular, it monitors the channel quality within the platoon and reacts by degrading platoon performance in presence of communication failures, or upgrading the performance when the communication quality is high enough. The reaction can include, e.g., adjusting the inter-vehicle distance or switching to another suitable platoon controller to prevent collisions. We focus on the functional and operational safety and evaluate the performance of the dynamic controller manager under different scenarios and settings in simulation experiments to demonstrate that it can avoid rear-end collisions in a platoon, continue platooning operation even in dense traffic scenarios where the state-of-the-art controllers fail to do so.

Latest technological trends lead toward systems connected to public networks even in critical domains. Bringing together safety and security work is becoming imperative, as a connected safety-critical system is not safe if it is not secure. The main objective of this study is to investigate the current status of safety and security co-analysis in system engineering by conducting a systematic literature review. The steps of the review are the following: the research questions identification; agreement upon a search string; applying the search string to chosen databases; a selection criterion formulation for the relevant publications filtering; selected papers categorization and analysis. We focused on the early system development stages and identified 33 relevant publications categorized as follows: combined safety and security approaches that consider the mutual influence of safety and security; safety-informed security approaches that consider influence of safety on security; and security-informed safety approaches that consider influence of security on safety. The results showed that a number of identified approaches are driven by needs in fast developing application areas, e.g., automotive, while works focusing on combined analysis are mostly application area independent. Overall, the study shows that safety and security co-analysis is still a developing domain.

Over the past decade technological development has lead to systems being connected to public networks in many critical domains. In such systems bringing safety and security work has become even more important, as a connected safety-critical system is not safe if it is not secure. Given this, the main goal of this study is to investigate the current status of safety and security co-analysis in system engineering by conducting a Systematic Literature Review. In this work we have focused on the early system development stages and identified 33 relevant publications categorised as: combined safety and security approaches that consider the mutual influence of safety and security; safety informed security approaches that consider influence of safety on security; and, security informed safety approaches that consider influence of security on safety. The results showed that a number of identified approaches are driven by needs in fast developing application areas, e.g., automotive, while works focusing on combined analysis are mostly application area independent. Overall, the study shows that safety and security co-analysis is still a developing domain, which requires solutions that rely on two separate disciplines, namely safety and security engineering.

Safety-critical systems are those systems whose malfunctioning can result in harm or loss of human life, or damage to property or the environment. Such systems usually need to comply with a domain- ...

Cooperation of vehicular systems is the stepping stone towards both road and indoor smart transportation systems. It aims at increasing transportation efficiency and safety compared to the stand-alone vehicular systems. The usage of wireless communication as the foundation of such safety-critical cooperation needs to be embraced with all its benefits and flaws compared to the wired communication. The cooperative functions need to be designed to adapt to the varying reliability of the wireless communication channels such that both the stand-alone vehicles as well as the smart transportation system formed by their cooperation are deemed sufficiently safe. In this paper we build upon a contract-based runtime monitoring architecture and propose a methodology for assuring adaptive behaviour of transportation with respect to the wireless communication channel failures. More specifically, we elaborate how safety analysis of the interaction of the wirelessly connected vehicles can be used as the basis for derivation of the adaptive modes and the corresponding contracts. Furthermore, we discuss how such contracts can be used as the basis for assurance of the adaptive wireless cooperation. We illustrate the proposed methodology on a smart transportation system of a factory.

The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has enabled Industry 4.0 as a new manufacturing paradigm. The envisioned future of Industry 4.0 and Smart Factories is to be highly configurable and composed mainly of the `things' that are expected to come with some, often partial, assurance guarantees. However, many factories are categorised as safety-critical, e.g. due to the use of heavy machinery or hazardous substances. As such, some of the guarantees provided by the `things', e.g. related to performance and availability, are deemed as necessary in order to ensure the safety of the manufacturing processes and the resulting products. In this paper, we explore key safety challenges posed by Industry 4.0 and identify the characteristics that its safety assurance should exhibit. We propose a set of safety assurance responsibilities, e.g. system integrators, cloud service providers and `things' suppliers. Finally, we reflect on the desirable modularity of such a safety assurance approach as a basis for cooperative, on-demand and continuous reasoning for Industry 4.0 architectures and services.