The Western Balkan Six economies have advanced structural reforms to boost economic growth, create new jobs, and bring living standards closer to those in Europe. However, the Western Balkan residents continue to be encouraged to look for career and educational possibilities outside of the region due to the slow rate of convergence and the significant development gap with other European nations. Over the past ten years, the Western Balkan emigration rate has increased by 10%, and as a result, about one-fifth of the population now lives outside of the region. The high levels of emigration that continue can be extremely challenging for development. They may cause skill shortages and labor market distortions, which may discourage potential investors from making investments because they are unable to find the necessary skills. Gaining competitiveness, attracting investment, and navigating the area's ecological and digital transition all depend on human capital and a competent workforce that can meet the labor market's skill requirements and spur innovation. They are also important pillars of an economy's resilience and prosperity, which is important in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the changing nature of the global environment. The goal of this paper is to examine how immigrants contribute to innovation in Western Balkans. Using Total Factor Productivity as a measure of innovation. The focus is on the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia). The relationship between migration and innovation is examined not only at regional, but also at sectoral level. This makes it possible to quantify the direct impact of immigrants in the industry where they are really employed. To address the potential endogeneity of migration we adopt instrumental variable technique originally devised by Card (2001). Moreover, we carried out the analysis of human capital composition across sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The offered recommendations can be used by policy makers when designing future policies. 

The study analyzes religious and cultural violence, focusing on the Genocide against Yazidis within the broader Kurdish socio-political framework. The ISIL genocidal intent against Yazidis includes forced relocation and practice attitudes that apply to elitism and sexual violence. It is part of the destruction of the group in terms of destruction of the spirit, will live and life itself (members) of the group. However, it should be noted that such views do not mean the legal argument for recognizing cultural genocide but an attempt to clarify the meaning of physical and biological destruction. Violence committed «in the name of religion» belongs to the dark side of religion. Violence (mostly) does not arise from the moral teachings of religions but from a perverted understanding of religion. The killing of members of a religious group is a form of physical genocide, and the threat of murder to ban religion was a way to commit cultural, that is, religious genocide. Sexual violence is different from all other weapons. The global community needs to be united to protect women and children during the war. Religion is used as an excuse for violence when the struggle is to defend the essential identity, when it is inconceivable to lose the struggle and when the struggle cannot be won. Religious support for violence causes the terrorist policy to become uncompromising. Paradoxically, just as terrorism produces fear of violence, so does the fear of terrorism produce violence