there are precious few of those) to invest the time needed to read a book that merely confirms existing cultural theory. It must be admitted, however, that this approach can sometimes yield spectacularly comic effects, as in the following discussion of Hrvoje Hribar’s 2005 film What is a Man Without a Mustache?: ‘the counter-archive thus invoked in Hribar’s film demands that Derrida’s perspective on Marx as mourning be examined against Deleuzian masochism to produce a detailed analysis of how Marx is still operative in post-socialism’ (161). Fortunately, not all of the contributions are this opaque and a few are quite enlightening. Post-Yugoslav Constellations is divided into three sections: ‘Entangled Legacies of Extreme Violence’; ‘Reclaiming the Past’; ‘Reconfiguring the Post-Yugoslav Present’. In the first, we find a number of articles focusing on literature and trauma. The wars of Yugoslav wars of the 1990s produced an exceptionally large amount of literary and cultural production on this theme, and the individual authors of this section make no attempt to systematize them. Rather, they focus on particular works, producing close readings that can serve as variations on a theme. Of these contributions, perhaps the two best are Antje Postema’s discussion of Ozren Kebo’s Sarajevo za početnike (Sarajevo, A Beginner’s Guide) and Vladimir Biti’s consideration of novels by Saša Stanišić and Ismet Percic. In both cases, the authors achieve what anyone writing about obscure literature from a little-known culture must do: they convince the reader that she should actually go out and read the works being discussed, and they provide a framework that would help this theoretical reader appreciate some of the nuances of what is being read. And given that the primary texts under discussion are all available in English translation, there is a fighting chance that a non-specialist in post-Yugoslav culture might be inspired to go and seek these books out, which, by the way, would be an excellent idea. The same consideration for non-native speakers of BCS is not to be found in the second section of the book. Here we are treated to complex discussions of works that, for the most part, have not been translated into English (or other major languages) and therefore we simply have to take the authors’ claims at face value. On the contrary, the last section of the book is the most accessible and successful. Guido Snel’s article on Dubravka Ugrešić and Danilo Kiš is simply a splendid examination of the role that archives, lists and other memory aids play in literature to overcome (or not) historical loss. And Vladimir Zorić’s article focusing on portraits of the Serbian philosopher Radomir Konstantinović in various media and at various historical periods provides enormous insight into the process of memorialization using a single telling example. Finally, Martin Pogačar’s essay on the digital afterlife of Yugoslav pop icons in post-Yugoslav cyberspace opens an entirely new and quite fascinating consideration of how ‘normal’ people use contemporary social media to commune with the dead and make sense of their own past and present.

What does the future hold for EU Enlargement? Our contributors reflect on this year’s European Commission reports on the progress achieved by EU candidate and potential candidate countries, framing it within the wider political and economic context of each country. (If you are interested in how this compares to last year’s reports, the 2015 expert reactions are available here). Eli Gateva on Macedonia: The Commission abandoned its diplomatic tone and delivered a damning diagnosis Esra Ozyurek on Turkey: Was this the very last enlargement report for Turkey? Jasmin Mujanovic on Bosnia and Herzegovina: The report reflects a disconnect between Brussels’ rhetoric and the reality in BiH Tena Prelec on Serbia: Perpetual electoral haggling is arguably real progress Krenar Gashi on Kosovo: Still far from membership, but catching up with the neighbours Petar Markovic on Montenegro: Speed-wise the unchallenged champion of accession negotiations, but implementation in key areas is still lacking Andi Hoxhaj on Albania: There is a good chance of opening accession negotiations over the next year

On 25 September, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s eastern and Serb-dominated entity, held a referendum on whether to keep a holiday marking its founding, in open defiance of decisions by the Bosnian Constitutional Court. As the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina prepares for elections on 2 October, Jasmin Mujanovic reflects on the failing state of the country’s democracy. He argues that, cornered by falling approval ratings, Republika Srpska’s President, Milorad Dodik, used the referendum as a ploy to keep the discourse away from real issues and firmly anchored to war-themed rhetoric. His actions are likely to prove detrimental for the whole country and encourage more dangerous schemes in the future.

Abstract In this reply to Daniel Bochsler and Basil Schläpfer, a number of issues prompted by their article ‘An indirect approach to map ethnic identities in post-conflict societies’, which proposes a method to estimate population shares in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in light of the lack of data on ethnicity from the most recent Bosnian census, are raised. In particular, two concerns are highlighted: firstly, whether estimates of the ethnic composition of the population can be free from the same politics that has affected the census itself; and secondly, what the practical purpose of producing such estimates might be.

..................................................................................................................................... ii Dedication. ................................................................................................................................ iii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... iv Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter I: Politics, the Political & the State in BiH ................................................................. 2

The Dayton Agreement continues to be mentioned as a potential model by Western politicians and pundits for various conflicts and sectarian violence around the globe, most recently for Syria, Ukraine and Iraq. Indeed, the Dayton Agreement is rightly associated by Bosnians and foreigners alike with the end of war and the absence of renewed armed conflict. However, for most people in BiH it is also associated with ushering in a political-economic order of inequality and dispossession, not only of the means of dignified livelihood, but of a future and the agentive capacities to shape that future. For this reason, most long-time observers caution against seeing BiH as a ‘success story,’ or at least recognizing it as one with a morbid after-life. The articles in this collection make clear that negotiations for peace between warring parties may not be the best conditions under which to design a system to secure freedom and prosperity. Indeed, they caution us to draw sharp distinctions between peace accords and social contracts.

This article compares two international attempts to promote reform of power-sharing institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina: failed European Union-led efforts to promote reform of the country's constitution, which was established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement; and the recent successful reform of Bosnia-Herzegovina's institutions of football governance, promoted by the game's international and European governing bodies, FIFA and UEFA. The article outlines the history of these two reform processes and seeks to explain why FIFA and UEFA have been more successful in promoting reform in this post-conflict setting than the EU. It argues that, in contrast to the EU, which has been vague about the precise reforms expected of Bosnia-Herzegovina's politicians, leaving the details to be negotiated by domestic political elites, FIFA and UEFA were more precise in their demands and were also willing to capitalise on popular frustration with the governance of the sport and to bypass nationalist elites who stood in the way of reform.

This article compares two international attempts to promote reform of power-sharing institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina: failed European Union-led efforts to promote reform of the country's constitution, which was established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement; and the recent successful reform of Bosnia-Herzegovina's institutions of football governance, promoted by the game's international and European governing bodies, FIFA and UEFA. The article outlines the history of these two reform processes and seeks to explain why FIFA and UEFA have been more successful in promoting reform in this post-conflict setting than the EU. It argues that, in contrast to the EU, which has been vague about the precise reforms expected of Bosnia-Herzegovina's politicians, leaving the details to be negotiated by domestic political elites, FIFA and UEFA were more precise in their demands and were also willing to capitalise on popular frustration with the governance of the sport and to bypass nationalist elites who stood in the way of reform.

"Across the asphalt and concrete of our raped land, comes a band of profiteers, carrying away our wealth.. .Flags have been sown, the children convinced, the knives distributed, our graveyards divided."Damir Avidic, "Po Asfaltu i Betonu"2There is a popular joke in Bosnia concerning the dealings of Milorad Dodik, the President of the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS) entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina, which says as much about Dodik as it does about the general state of affairs in the country as a whole. As the story goes, Dodik visits the (now former) Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, in a fabulous villa just outside of Rome. Dodik is dazzled by the splendour of the Prime Minister's manse and inquires how, as a public servant, Berlusconi had managed to live in such luxury. Berlusconi takes Dodik to a secluded balcony and shows him a sprawling highway off in the distance. He explains that through some clever bookkeeping, he and his associates had managed to shave two centimeters off each side of the road from what the original blueprints had called for, and in the process had saved millions - which they had then pocked for themselves and hence his impressive home. A few months later, it is Berlusconi visiting Dodik and upon his arrival, the Italian can scarce believe his eyes; Dodik's mansion is easily twice the size of his own and immeasurably more luxurious. Berlusconi pleads with Dodik to explain how he managed to find the funds to build such a home and, obliging, is taken to a large bay window overlooking the countryside. "Do you see our fabulous new highway, Silvio?" "No, all I see is empty fields." "Exactly!"The above is as telling and succinct of a narrative about the general state of Bosnian society as one is likely to find. After all, BosniaHerzegovina is a country where even respected academics and policy analysts are forced to concede that it "is a great place to be a politician but a shitty place to be a citizen" (Siddiqui 2011). Yet with more government ministers, bureaucrats and international administrators of various sorts than countries many times its size, trudging across its cities, towns, villages and hamlets, Bosnia utterly lacks any meaningful, popular political mobilization. The weight of post-war Bosnian politics has instead served to depoliticize the people of the area; it has made them beholden to the machinations of local and foreign oligarchs.Newspapers in Bosnia's three "main" cities (Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar), most catering to one of the country's three "constitutive peoples" (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats), report with breathless regularity on the latest in scandalous political pronouncements. The bombastic nationalist rhetoric of Dodik is a popular theme amongst the Sarajevo papers, for example, who react with fury at his weekly suggestions that "Bosnia is a failed experiment" or his frequent negations of genocide in the country during the 1990s (Dervisbegovic 2011). These statements are declared as "unacceptable," in turn, by the representatives of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as well as the European Union Special Representative, and the subsequent exchanges reported on with equally repetitive and vapid zeal (Tanjug 2011). The process begins anew the next week.Meanwhile, substantive political dialogue or mobilization is almost entirely absent, despite the steadily deteriorating standard of living for all Bosnians, regardless of ethnicity. The handful of dominant political parties in the country, most of which are exclusively ethno-nationalist in orientation, have managed to sequester the realm of "political action" to their theatrical antagonisms - what locals refer to as nacionalisticko prepucavanje: hackneyed nationalist bickering or "trolling." Said theatrics, of course, and as our earlier joke suggested, are widely understood to be the front operations for the actual day-to-day routine of Bosnian political economy: corruption on an endemic scale, orchestrated by nationalist oligarchs, which has resulted in the systematic dispossession of even the meagre social wealth and infrastructure that survived the war (Corruption 'Humongous' in Bosnia 2008). …