The process of accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the EU implies the introduction of EU standards on Private International Law into its internal legislation. This paper includes considerations related to the ways of implementation of the reform of private international law, having in mind the complex constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the division of competencies between the State and its entities. Bearing in mind the complexity of the decision-making process of different levels and the inability to reach political consensus on the reform, the article emphasises alternative mechanisms for introducing EU standards in the field of private international law into the legal system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the external competence of the EU in its relations with third countries, this article gives a thorough analysis of the possibility of concluding international agreements in the field of private international law.

INTRODUCTION In the 1950s and 1960s, former Yugoslavia entered into bilateral treaties on legal assistance with Austria (Treaty 3), Bulgaria (Treaty 22), Czechoslovakia (Treaty 13), Hungary (Treaty 25), Poland (Treaty 26) and Romania (Treaty 27). Today these treaties are in force between the four successor countries of Yugoslavia – i.e. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth: B&H), North Macedonia (henceforth: Macedonia) and Montenegro – and all the abovementioned European countries, which in the meantime have become EU Member States (in the case of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia as its successors). Each of these bilateral treaties contains the conflict-of-laws rules and procedural rules on succession that take precedence over, respectively, the rules of the Succession Regulation (Article 75(1)) in the contracting parties that are now EU Member States and the national private international law (PIL) rules in the four successor countries of former Yugoslavia that are not EU members. As these rules are based on the principle of nationality and the principle of the location of the estate, they are completely incompatible with the rules of the Succession Regulation and are, therefore, undesirable in the EU Member States. From the perspective of the successor countries of former Yugoslavia, a general assessment of the rules on succession contained in bilateral treaties cannot be given, mainly because international succession law is not consistently regulated in the successor countries: the rules of Serbian, B&H and Macedonian international succession law are based on traditional principles that correspond to those of the bilateral treaties, while the rules of Montenegrin international succession law follow the principles contained in the Succession Regulation. In order to make a proper assessment, it is first necessary to make a few remarks on the conflict-of-laws and procedural rules on succession in Serbia, B&H, Macedonia and Montenegro and then to look into the conflict-of-laws regimes and the procedural rules of the bilateral treaties in detail. A FEW REMARKS ON NATIONAL PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES IN SUCCESSION MATTERS SERBIA AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA The main legal source of private international law in Serbia and B&H is the Act on Resolution of Conflict of Laws with Regulations of Other Countries (henceforth: PIL Act), which was enacted in 1982 in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (henceforth: SFRY) and is, with minor amendments, still in force today in both countries.

The freedom of services by correspondence should be one of the most important market freedoms in the EU legislative politics and the CJEU jurisprudence. The announcement of the establishment of a fifth market freedom on data flow is directly addressed by the freedom of services by correspondence. The growing importance of the freedom of services in general is in line with the rise of the EU service sector as the main contributor to growth and employment in the EU, accounting for about two thirds of both EU employment and value added. In addition, since 2015 the Digital Single Market is one of European Commission’s political priority that aims at providing free access to online services. Online services are in most part services by correspondence, where neither provider nor recipient travels cross border. The truth is that the freedom of services by correspondence is barely ever mentioned explicitly neither by EU legislator nor by the CJEU. The EU legislator has rather chosen a sectoral approach to the Digital Single Market, fragmenting the fifth market freedom to several narrow pieces of legislation. The paper deals with the question why the freedom of services by correspondence has not acquired the same position as the freedom of goods. The analysis will focus on answering this question on the grounds of the theory of convergence of market freedoms and its limits.

Through the judgments Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige, the CJEU emphasised the power of the CFR (in particular arts 7, 8, 52) through the fundamental right of data protection and general principles of law such as the principle of proportionality and legal certainty. Article 52 CFR represents the essence of justification. In the spirit of article 52(3) and (4) CFR it becomes evident that the CJEU, the ECtHR and the German Constitutional Court go in the same direction. The CJEU was brave enough to deliver a scathing verdict on data retention. More strongly than the German CC, the CJEU safeguards data protection. Hence, the decisions of the CJEU were described as milestone decisions and the CJEU as a Court of fundamental rights. On the other hand, the CJEU focused all its power on proportionality expressed through the element of strict necessity. It is astonishing that the Court does not use the existing methodology on proportionality to strengthen legal discipline and confidence. Although proportionality may be assessed differently in single legal systems and cultures, the broad constitutionalisation and application of proportionality in jurisdiction proves the power of this general principle of law. The exploration of this principle is rather challenging, but most beneficial for the future application of primary law