This paper explores both theoretical and practical dimensions of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies, with a specific focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the role of the High Representative, established by Annex 10 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Peace Agreement). By analysing the functioning of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the study investigates the scope and limitations of the liberal institutionalist approach to peacebuilding, which dominated international intervention strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1995. The paper argues that classical institutional models failed to adequately respond to the fragmented political landscape and deep ethno-political divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to a gradual transformation of the High Representative’s mandate from a coordinating body to a politically active institution with significant executive powers. The aim of this study is to examine the institutional evolution of the OHR and assess its contribution to state-building and peace preservation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while also critically engaging with broader debates on the effectiveness of international peacebuilding in complex post-conflict environments. The research employs a qualitative methodology, including the analysis of primary documents (Annex 10, decisions of the OHR, legal acts), secondary sources (academic literature, international reports), and a case study approach based on a chronological review of the actions taken by High Representatives from 1995 to 2021. The analysis focuses on three core areas where the intervention of the High Representative had a decisive impact: (1) the imposition of binding decisions and laws in cases where domestic political actors failed to reach consensus; (2) judicial reforms and the annulment of rulings by domestic courts that were seen as contrary to the peace agreement; and (3) the dismissal of political officials deemed to be violating the Dayton Agreement or undermining the constitutional order. Findings indicate that this form of international tutelage contributed to short-term stabilization and institutional functionality but also raised concerns over democratic legitimacy and the limited ownership of domestic actors in the reform process. The theoretical framework links traditional liberal peacebuilding approaches with more recent critiques that emphasize the need for deeper local participation, long-term capacity-building, and context-sensitive governance. In this regard, the Bosnia and Herzegovina case illustrates the ambivalence of international interventions—balancing between ensuring stability and respecting sovereignty, and between delivering quick institutional fixes and fostering sustainable domestic governance. Scholarly and political critiques of the OHR’s role vary widely—from accusations of autocratic governance to acknowledgments of its necessity—thus exposing the ongoing tension between efficiency and legitimacy in international administration. The paper concludes that while the institution of the High Representative has played a critical role in maintaining peace and facilitating institutional development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, long-term sustainability requires a shift from external supervision to internal political consensus. The contribution of this research lies in its systematic analysis of the institutional trajectory of the OHR and its theoretical interpretation within broader debates on post-conflict international governance. The findings offer valuable insights for future peacebuilding missions in similarly complex environments.

This paper shows how the processes of trust-building and power-sharing are evolving in the cases of Zimbabwe and Bosnia-Herzegovina after the conflict. The paper’s focus lies on lack of trust between different ethnic groups in the post-war period in terms of building political institutions and common political identity. Zimbabwe ethnic tensions originating from the Gukurahundi (1983-1987) between the Shona and the Ndebele people spilt over to the post-ethnic conflict society. Despite having the peace agreement known as the Unity Accord of 1987 to reduce tension in Zimbabwe, power-sharing remains the most untapped area for discussion. Similarly, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) and the ethnic distribution of power given by the Dayton Peace Agreement are still one of the most significant elements of uncertainty and insecurity with dysfunctional ethnically based power-sharing as a result. With this review paper, we tend to answer several questions: What is the primary source of distrust and insecurity in post-conflict societies in Zimbabwe and Bosnia concerning the origins of those issues? What are the efforts of state institutions to promote unity and peace, and how do these peace accords affect institution-building processes?