Since Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of independence in 1995, its path has been a rocky one. Unwillingness by the international community to stand by the central government and stand in the way of the neighboring states of Serbia and Croatia’s territorial pretensions, produced a succession of ceasefire agreements, culminating in the final, Dayton Peace Agreement. Each of these agreements espoused the ethnic principle as the guiding philosophy for the organization of the state. The post-war period demonstrates that despite the passage of time, the principle of organization of multi-ethnic state along ethnic lines presents a stumbling block to the functioning of the political, economic and social life in the country. The political history of post-independence Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) therefore reads as a history of protracted political paralysis, with no hope of rectifying the problems without another forceful intervention of the international community.

Abstract The Bosnian Islamic community has led the Islamic affairs of most Slavic Muslims in the Balkans since 1882. While authoritarian and secularist states represented considerable dangers for its survival, freedom in independent Bosnia brought its set of challenges. Since the 1990s, is faced three major dynamics: efforts of the dominant Bosniak Party to involve the Islamic Community in spearheading the nation-building drive among the Bosniaks; the pluralisation of Islamic authorities and influences coming in from the Islamic world (especially from Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and from Turkey); and the increasing pluralisation of the Islamic scene within the country. All have variously challenged the Bosnian Islamic community’s practice, authority and monopoly. The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IZ BiH) has met those challenges by gradually detaching itself from national politics, by balancing foreign influences and by building up its institutional capacities.

: Understanding the role of religious communities in Croatia and Bosnia and Her-zegovina’s post-Communist societies is very important for grasping the nature and history of democratic development in these two countries. A close investigation reveals that the relationship between the political and religious elites is cruci-al, but also subject to change given the shifting nature of social developments. Three stages in this relationship can be observed. The first phase started with the collapse of Yugoslavia and Communism in 1991-1992 and lasted until the early 2000s. This was a formative stage for the new societies, and religion played a key role in the national homogenisation and construction of new identities. The second phase, which started in the early 2000s and lasted most of the decade, was a period of relative economic prosperity, with a weakening of the nationalist political elites’ sway, and consequently a weakening of the role of the religious organisations. The third phase, which started with the financial crisis of 2008 and is still ongoing, is marked by a renewed populist and rightist agenda in politics, which has also resulted in a strengthening of the public role of organised religion in both countries.

Under the AKP government, Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Western Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, has led many analysts to suspect it of possessing neo-imperial, or so-called neo-Ottoman, objectives. These suspicions have been compounded by the repeated declarations of former Prime Minister Davutoğlu and current President Erdoğan that the history and religious identity shared by Turks and Western Balkan Muslims forms the basis of both Turkish-Balkan relations and a common future. Critical examination of official Ankara’s attitudes toward the Western Balkans in general, and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, identifies four distinct phases in which cultural, historical, and religious appeals morphed into the set of distinctive foreign policies. These policies have also been shaped by pragmatic pursuits of regional influence, the effects of internal (Turkish) transformations, and more recently, the ad hoc policies of President Erdoğan. This article will reconstruct the development of Turkish foreign policy since 1990, from multilateral and soft power efforts to religious and economic objectives, and will analyse the limits of this policy.

The foreign policy of the Western Balkan states is formulated on the basis of several factors, many of which do not reflect their strategic national interests. An important contributing factor is that all Western Balkan countries could be defined as small states, despite the fact that within the region some of them are considered as being comparatively large and strong. The potential for formulation and implementation of foreign policy in all of these states is very low, due to a number of reasons. These include small territories and population, weak economies, unfinished democracy-building processes, and a generally unsettled situation, typical of transitional societies. All these aspects make states in the region to a large extent dependant on the interests of bigger powers, as well as susceptible to policies of the international organizations active in the region. Western Balkan states, therefore, to varying extents, identify their foreign policies with the policies of different external actors.