Towards Attack Models in Autonomous Systems of Systems
In context of safety-critical Systems of Systems (SoS) that are built as a collection of several systems capable of fulfilling their own function as well as the overall SoS function, increase production efficiency and decrease human effort in such systems, one has to be able to guarantee critical properties such as safety and security. It is not sufficient to analyze and guarantee these critical properties isolated one from another, but one has to be able to provide joint analysis and guarantees on safety and security. This paper is our initial effort towards building a common safety and security assurance approach for complex SoS, where we start from identification and analysis of attack models and connecting them to the already identified functional safety requirements. In this way we will be able to assess system assets and vulnerabilities, and identify ways how an attacker could exploit them. We aim to connect attack modeling process to safety process by aligning mitigation strategies with safety requirements.